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Abstract
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important opinion concerning Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempted monop-
olization. The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, limits the circumstances under
which antitrust law will compel companies to assist their rivals.
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Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an 
important opinion concerning Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization 
and attempted monopolization.  The opinion, 
written by Justice Scalia, limits the circumstances 
under which antitrust law will compel companies 
to assist their rivals.
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,1 arose in the context of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act and related regula-
tions, administrative interpretations, and agree-
ments.  These required incumbent local exchange 
carriers (LECs) to provide certain interconnection 
services and facilities to rivals at cost-based rates. 
In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission 
and the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) 
investigated whether Verizon, the incumbent LEC 
in New York City, discriminated against its rivals in 
fulfilling orders for certain of these required services 
and facilities.  These investigations culminated with 
Verizon agreeing to a consent decree with the FCC 
and the New York PSC entering a series of orders 
concerning Verizon’s obligations.   
 
 Trinko, a New York City customer of AT&T, 
filed a lawsuit immediately after the FCC consent 
decree was entered.  Trinko claimed that Verizon 
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by alleg-
edly carrying out a scheme to discourage consum-
ers from becoming or remaining customers of its 
competitors, including AT&T, “thus impeding the 
competit[ors’] ability to enter or compete in the 
market for local telephone service.”  The complaint 
identified only one action by Verizon that was part 
of the alleged anticompetitive scheme: the failure 
to properly provide interconnection services, which 
was the subject of the FCC consent decree and the 
New York PSC orders.
The Supreme Court held that Trinko had not 
stated a claim under Section 2.2  First, the Court 
observed that, although the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act contained an antitrust “savings clause,” 
it provided only that the Act preserved claims that 
satisfy established antitrust standards and thus did 
not alter otherwise applicable antitrust principles. 
Consequently, even though the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act required Verizon to provide inter-
connection services, it did not create new antitrust 
duties beyond those that otherwise existed.
Second, the Court explained that the antitrust 
laws only rarely require a company to cooperate 
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1  Wilmer Cutler & Pickering represented an amicus curie before the Court.
2  Three Justices concurred but would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals solely on the ground that Trinko lacked 
standing to bring the claim under the antitrust laws.  
3  The Court also stated that, because the 1996 Telecommunications Act, itself, gives rivals access to Verizon’s network, the case 
presented no opportunity to address the “essential facilities” doctrine that some lower courts have recognized.
with its rivals.  Such a requirement could lessen in-
centives for investment by both the monopolist and 
its rivals, “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: col-
lusion,” and require antitrust courts to act as central 
planners.   The Court emphasized its previous hold-
ings that antitrust law does not condemn the exercise 
of monopoly power, standing alone: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, 
and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an im-
portant element of the free-market system. 
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices at 
least for a short period is what attracts busi-
ness acumen in the first place; it induces risk 
taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth.  To safeguard the incentive to innovate, 
the possession of monopoly power will not be 
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
element of anticompetitive conduct.
   
Third, t h e  Court explained that Trinko’s claims 
did not fall within any previously recognized 
exception to the general rule that the antitrust 
laws do not require a company to deal with its 
rivals.  Trinko relied heavily on Aspen Skiing Co. 
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
601 (1985).  Aspen involved a firm that ended a 
profitable arrangement with a rival jointly to offer 
multi-mountain ski ticket packages, and refused 
even to sell lift tickets for its ski areas to its rival 
at retail prices, so that the rival could assemble 
ticket packages itself.  In those circumstances, 
the Court held that a jury could hold the firm li-
able under Section 2 because its refusal to deal 
with its rival “suggested a willingness to forsake 
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive 
end” -- i.e., the firm would recoup its lost profits 
by charging monopoly prices after eliminating its 
rival.   Trinko, by contrast, failed to allege that 
Verizon had ceased a profitable course of dealing 
with its competitors, or even that it would ever 
have cooperated with its competitors absent statu-
tory compulsion.  
The Court declined to add a new exception to 
encompass Trinko’s allegations, stating that Aspen 
“is at or near the boundary of §2 liability.”   The 
Court emphasized that the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act created a regulatory scheme to deter and 
remedy the anticompetitive harm Trinko alleged. 
Thus, the residual role for antitrust enforcement to 
play is small compared to the costs of applying the 
antitrust laws, which would include the possibility 
of wrongfully deterring procompetitive conduct, 
the probability of interminable litigation, and the 
difficulty that a court would face in supervising the 
day-to-day issues inherent in compelled coopera-
tion among rival firms.3  
Trinko is a major victory for incumbent LECs, 
whose potential antitrust liability under Section 2 
for failures to fulfill obligations under the 1996 
Telecommunications Act has been greatly cir-
cumscribed.  More generally, the Court’s decision 
signals a cautionary note to plaintiffs hoping to 
use the antitrust laws to force companies to help 
current or potential rivals to compete.
If you would like more information about the 
Trinko case or any other issue of U.S. or foreign 
antitrust or competition law, please contact us at: 
(202) 663-6000.
Robert Bell                     
Lee Greenfield
Veronica Kayne
William Kolasky
Jim Lowe
Doug Melamed
Thomas Mueller
Ali Stoeppelwerth
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art36
